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JAPANESE SUPREME COURTl-ITS

INSTITUTION AND BACKGROUND
Hideo Chikusa*

A

Preface

quite aptly spoken by Dean Attanasio, despite the ever close
relationship between the United States and Japan, the information available about Japan inside the United States is extremely

limited.
Since Dean Attanasio requested that I present a lecture regarding the
Japanese Supreme Court, I would like to describe its institutions where I
am a member. In doing so, I would also like to cover some background
information including an overview of the Japanese judicial system as a
whole and its social and historical surroundings.
I. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND
JAPANESE SYSTEMS
A.

SIMILARITIES-PROCESS OF ESTABLISHMENT

The present Japanese courts were established under the new constitution promulgated in 1946, that is, immediately after the Second World
War. The basic fabric of this constitution is based upon the U.S. Constitution. As far as the judicial system is concerned, the current constitution
has the following differences from the previous one.
Japan established its first constitution in 1889, which year is called the
22nd Year of Meiji, after the reigning Emperor's name. This so-called
"Meiji Constitution" laid the foundation for Japan joining the modem
states.
This constitution was patterned after the Continental Law, particularly
the German constitutional system. The Daishin'in,or the Major Court of
Review, established under this old Constitution, fulfilled the function as
the court of final review for both civil and criminal cases.
1. This article is the result of some relatively minor revisions I made to the original
draft article of the same title on the basis of which I made a lecture on February 19, 1999,
at SMU Law School. In translating the original draft of the article, I owe my gratitude to
Mr. Haruhiro Nakatsu, attorney-at-law, who is the graduate of Academy of AngloAmerican Law, 1960-1961, my immediate predecessor. Mr. Nakatsu is active in the
international practice as a partner in the International Division of Asuka-Kyowa Law Firm
in Tokyo. My sincere thanks are addressed to him.
* Hideo Chikusa is a Justice on the Supreme Court of Japan.
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For administrative cases, there was a separate court called the Administrative Court. Although it is called a "court," it was in fact a part of the
administrative system. It functioned to correct erroneous administrative
decisions and actions, but the conditions for allowing a citizen to file any
lawsuit of this type were restricted, and it did not function as the system
to protect citizens' rights against administrative abuses.
Under the new Constitution, this shortcoming was overcome by unifying the entire system and by abolishing any special type of court. By
subjecting all sorts of cases, including the administrative cases, to the ordinary court jurisdictions, our judicial system became like the judicial system of the United States. At the same time, the courts were given the
power to review the constitutionality of all laws, ordinances, rulings, and
administrative acts. The so-called "supremacy of judicial power" was thus
established.
B.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE

Two

SUPREME COURTS

Because differences exist between the United States and Japan in their
foundations and their respective histories, those differences could be easy
to misunderstand. Thus, when we discuss the differences in their judicial
systems, we should take into consideration their respective sociological
backgrounds, which I will do later. But, let me start by pointing out the
differences in their outward appearances.
1. Structures of the Courts
The Japanese Supreme Court has fifteen justices, not nine like the
United States. The justices' career backgrounds are respectively, six career judges (consisting of four who majored in civil cases and two who
majored in criminal cases), two who have been prosecutors, four who
have been practitioners, one diplomat, one professor from the law department of a university, and one administrative official (often the former
head of Legislation Bureau of the Cabinet).
The break-down just mentioned has undergone some changes in the
past, but by and large the similar structure has been maintained since the
inception of the Court. When one justice retires, the new candidate is
nominated from the same group or profession as that from which the
retiree was chosen from. And in the overwhelming number of cases, the
candidate was appointed as the successor. This is due to the policy pronounced when the Court was established that, in order to substantiate the
mission assigned to the new Court, not only the legal professions but
other professions should be included to incorporate their wisdom.
2. Grand Bench and Petit Benches
Discussion and adjudication of cases by fifteen justices are, however,
not always easy, and at the inception of the Court's history, the reforma-
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tion proposals were considered many times.2 The established structure is
that three Petit Benches with five justices each are installed, and each one
decides the ordinary cases assigned to it. The Grand Bench deals only
with cases (i) involving constitutional issues, (ii) bearing socially important issues, (iii) requiring the unified views of the Court where opinons of
two or more Petit Benches differ from each other, or (iv) requiring the
alteration of the holdings of the Court's own precedents. If the cases are
counted by reference to the issues involved, as opposed to the inceptional
era, the trend is that the number of cases handled by the Grand Bench is
just one or two, or at the largest, just several per year. This is due to the
fact that a case containing the same issue was probably already adjudicated earlier by the Grand Bench, and it may be adjudicated later by the
Petit Bench citing the preceding judgment entered by the Grand Bench.
3. Appointment and Guarantee of Tenure
I do not think that there is any substantial difference between the
United States and Japan in the professional independence and the guarantee of tenure of the justices. In the case of the justices of the Japanese
Supreme Court, however, the retirement age is fixed at seventy (in the
case of judges in general, sixty-five, and in the case of the judges in the
summary court, seventy). Since the justices are appointed at the age of
more than sixty, the tenure is almost always less than ten years, and frequently less than five years. Apart from the merit that it refreshes the
Court, one can not deny the clerical tiresomeness of always having to
handle the retirement of someone among as many as fifteen.
The Cabinet appoints justices (with the exception of the appointment
of the Chief Justice whose appointment is made by the Emperor upon the
designation made by the Cabinet 3) and the Emperor acknowledges the
appointment. 4 The judges may not be dismissed except through the judgment of impeachment, unless he or she is ruled as incapable of fulfilling
his or her mission due to physical or mental health defects. The judges
may be subject to disciplinary actions by the court on the basis of the Law
of Professional Careers of Judges.5
Additionally, the appointment of justices must be submitted to a national vote at the time of the election of the members of the House of
Representatives to be conducted for the first time of the appointment of
a justice and subsequently at 10-year intervals. If a majority of votes is for6
the dismissal of a particular justice, the justice in question is dismissed.
This has, however, never happened.
2. Saiko-saibansyo Kikokaikaku Mondai Kankei Shiryo (Materials Concerning the
Problems on Reorganization of the Supreme Court) published by Secritaria-general of the
Supreme Court in 1957, 58 Vols. 1-6.
3. See KENPO art. 6 and Article 39 of the Law of Court.
4. See Article 39, Paragraph 3 of the Law of Court
5. See KENPO, art. 78.
6. See KENPO, art. 79.
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4. System of Judicial Research Officials
In the United States, each justice employs law clerks to assist the justice's pursuit of his or her professional duties. A similar institution in Japan is the system of judicial research officials. This is a collection of
young career judges. There are about twice as many judicial research officials as the number of justices, and they do not report exclusively to a
particular justice.
As with the justices, the pending cases are distributed to the judicial
research officials in the order of receipt in the docket, and the one to
whom a case is distributed assists the justice to whom the identical case
happens to be assigned by researching as directed by that justice. The
judicial research officials are generally judges who have sat on the bench
for ten and twenty years, and at present, there are sixteen members in
charge of civil cases, five in charge of administrative cases, nine in charge
of criminal cases, and a few (now three) assistant judges.
5. JudicialAdministration-AdministrationBureau
All of the judicial power belongs to the Supreme Court, and the lower
courts have been established in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the law. 7 As a result, the system, operation, budget, and personnel
management of the courts, including the lower courts, are governed by
the Supreme Court. Thus, management of this administrative system
bears a considerable importance. The major decisions are determined by
the Conference of the Justices inside the Supreme Court who convene
every Wednesday. To efficiently handle the practical aspects, the Administration Bureau of the Supreme Court, a special body to which the task is
assigned, must be well organized and functional. In this bureau, a considerable number of the people who have the designation of judge are assigned to support the management of the entire judicial system. This
system and its operation are related to the traditional Japanese system,
and is said to be unique among all the countries.
6. Non-Existence of the FederalSystem
Since the United States is the united federation of the states, and its
Federal Supreme Court sits on the apex of the entire judicial system, the
Court adjudicates the constitutional legitimacy of interpretation and application of federal law. As opposed to this, Japan is not a federation of
states, and its judicial system is an unitary one throughout the country.
We do not have problems which arise from being a federal state. It could
therefore be said that the Japanese Supreme Court is similar to any U.S.
state supreme court, including the function of constitutionality review of
the lower laws and ordinances.
7. See

KENPO,

art. 76.
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GEOGRAPHICAL CHARATERISTICS AND CULTURE
OF JAPAN
A.

GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS

1. Overcrowded Archipelago Extending in North-South Direction
The Japanese territory is an archipelago (chain of islands) on the northeastern coastline of the Asian continent and, although its north-south extension matches that of the United States, the whole of its space is slightly
less than 370,000 sq km, and is still less than the space of California,
which is 410,000 sq km. Furthermore, more than 70% of Japan is covered
by the mountains and forests. Historically, Japan is a country of agriculture, but due to the scarcity of flat lands, it presently does not have the
ability to supply enough food to its own nationals. The total population is
now approximately 120,000,000 which equals about half of the population
of the United States. Thus, if you try to imagine what Japan is like today,
you could imagine states such as Washington, Oregon and California
alongside the Western coast of the United States separated from the continent, sunk underneath the Pacific, and only leaving half of their territory as an island. And there, a population of about half of the United
States immigrated and lived.
2. Restriction in Livable Space and Over-CongestedSociety
What happens when so many people live in such a limited space? We
could well say that it is one of the most grand experiments in a history of
mankind.
If you fly at night along the length of the Japanese archipelago, you will
find an incessant, continuing line of the artificial lights and residential
houses along the coastline and the main highways from the southern Kyushu to Tokyo. These areas are administratively divided into many prefectures, cities, towns and villages, but are physically unified without any
conspicuous borders. To use a metaphor, the country called Japan is an
integrated circuit chip, small but highly and tightly organized.

B.

CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE SOCIETY: CLOSED AND STABLE;
UNIFIED AND HOMOGENEOUS (300 YEARS OF HISTORY
TRACED BACK TO THE TOKUGAWA ERA)

In ancient times, the population was much less than today's population,
but the fact remains that many people lived in a limited territory. Since
Japan is an island country and it is physically segregated, few foreigners
came there, and few Japanese left its boundary.
The time period for 300 years from the 17th Century to thel9th Century, before Japan became a modern country, is locally known as the
"Tokugawa Era." During this era, Japan was governed by Samurais who
maintained the generally warless country, and within this feudalistic
peace the Japanese culture was fermented.
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Japan was certainly a closed society from the outside, but inside, the
society had enough information exchanged to be unified, hierarchical,
and well governed. A natural development to Japan becoming a modem
state at the outset of this century was the introduction of the European
political system. Japan soon started to be one of the powers in the global
context under the leadership of its government as a unified nation. Since
Japan is a bureaucrat-governed state, that is unified, homogeneous, and
closed, which had developed during the past 300 years, change would be
difficult despite the increasing trend of its society and economy toward
internationalization.
III.
A.

CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDICIAL SYSTEM

RECONCILIATORY SPIRIT PRONE TO BE AGAINST DISPUTES

Dispute in a real society sometimes persists, and dies hard. In our
country where people must live in a limited territory in a closed society,
mutual concessions are required for mutual survival. This reconciliatory
spirit is partially explained by the influence of traditional Confucianism,
but the main reason is the desire to reside in a preparedness to find peace
and harmony. This explains why what is called the "concilliation procedure" tends to be used more frequently than formal litigation requiring a
black-and-white determination, and why many cases are settled out of
court.
B.

POPULATION OF LAWYERS

While there are about 900,000 American lawyers, there are less than
17,000 Japanese lawyers nationwide. There are fewer than 3,000 Japanese
judges, including the judges at the summary courts, and there are even
fewer prosecutors. This comparison should not, however, be exaggerated. We would also have to take into account the fact that the graduates
from the law departments of universities in Japan are slightly more than
law school graduates in the United States, and those graduates are absorbed into the administration and the industry as the staff of their legal
departments. And, in addition to the lawyers admitted to the bar in Japan, there are many other legal professions, such as tax counsels, public
accountants, civil scriveners, administrative scriveners, and industrial
property counsels, all nationally licensed. With these perspectives, the
whole society in legal context of Japan is not substantially different from
that of the United States, but it remains true that in Japan, there are
fewer trials and, accordingly, far fewer people who are directly engaged
in handling litigation.
C.

CAREER SYSTEM OF JUDGES

Japanese judges are appointed immediately after they finish their legal
training, and they remain judges until retirement age. This principle still
survives. Of course, there are some exceptions. First of all, as previously
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mentioned, the selection of the justices in the Supreme Court is not made
on the basis of this principle. Since the judges, prosecutors and lawyers
have the same qualifications, their exchanges are possible, so that presently there are more than several practicing lawyers per year who are
appointed as judges, and there are many judges who are transferred to
the Ministry of Justice and the other ministries to take jobs in the national
legislative bodies. Nevertheless, an overwhelming number of judges continue to work as judges from the time of appointment until their retirement. Against this trend, criticisms are sometimes raised from lawyers at
the bar who say that the career judges do not have experience of the real
world, or are much too bureaucratic in handling their jobs, and the whole
system must be revolutionalized in the Anglo-American fashion so that
all legal professionals are raised from the identical cradle of the "bar."
D.

INSTITUTION FOR EDUCATION OF LEGAL PRACTICES

There is an educational institution attached to the Supreme Court
called "Shiho Kenshu Sho" (Judicial Research and Training Institute).
Those who pass the National Law Examination can enter it. The trainees
educated there, after undergoing a two-year traineeship and passing the
so-called "second examination," obtain the basic qualifications to become
either judges, prosecutors, or lawyers. This institution may be called a
sort of national law school. It was established as early as the new judicial
system started under the new Constitution and is still there. This is certainly an excellent system for training the legal professionals to have
equal and common qualities and abilities. It, however, has a shortcoming
in that, because all costs and expenses for maintaining and running the
institution are borne by the national government, budgetary restrictions
prevent the abrupt increase in the number of trainees. Also, one could
not deny that criticism exists against training practitioners at the national
expense.
E. THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU
There is a problem as to at which point on the constitutionality development of a governmental action should be examined. For example,
when the government decides to dispatch its self-defense force abroad, at
what stage and by whom is it permissible to review the constitutionality
of the decision of the government? Article 9 of the Constitution declares
the total abolition of war as the means to solve international problems.
I understand that under the German system, this type of problem may
be examined and determined by the Constitutional Court in advance of
its implementation. The Supreme Court of Japan, however, renders its
judgment on the constitutionality only through concrete cases of dispute,
and therefore it does not give any such judgment until the issue comes
before it, after going through the lower courts' review.
In order to study any kind of legal problems inside the government,
involving such a constitutional issue, there is an body called "Hosei Ky-

1726

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

oku," or the Legislation Bureau, inside the Cabinet. The views of the
Government itself are determined based upon its opinion. The head of
this bureau is a member of the Cabinet and is often appointed from
judges and prosecutors. And, as I mentioned earlier, he or she is often
later appointed as a justice of the Supreme Court.
Also, the other departments of the Legislation Bureau review the
drafts of law, cabinet ordinances, and the ministerial ordinances to prevent any draft bearing a constitutional problem or being inconsistent with
the legal system as a whole from being produced to the Diet. This function is close to that of the French Conseil D'Etat, and by virtue of this
preliminary review, there is very little chance that any new legislation
contravening the Constitution or the established legislative frameworks
would see the light of day. Because of the leadership played by the Government in general, so far, the Government has prepared almost all of the
drafts of the law produced to and passed by the Diet. 8
IV. DISPOSITION OF CASES BY SUPREME COURT AND ITS
CONSTITUTIONALITY REVIEW
A.

INCREASE IN CASES AND DISPOSITIONS BY COURT

The increase in the number of cases, particularly civil cases, is a common phenomenon all over the world, and Japan is no exception to that
trend.9 It is perhaps rightly pointed out that in peacetime, the standard of
living increases, and the number of criminal cases decreases. Conversely,
the economic activity of the citizens is stimulated, and the consciousness
of rights is intensified and the number of civil cases increases. This observation is squarely applicable to Japan's recent situation. The number of
criminal cases decreased to one-third, while the number of civil cases increased three times during the 50 years after the War.
B.

DISPOSITION OF CASES

With respect to the Supreme Court, the annual number of pending civil
cases have been consistently over 1,000 cases, and sometimes they exceed
2,000 cases. At the same time, criminal cases have decreased from 500 to
1,000 cases. In overwhelming events, a case is disposed of within six
months.' 0
8. Any draft of law prepared by the Members of the Diet is also examined beforehand by the other Legislative Bureau installed inside the Diet.
9. Looking only at civil cases, the number of the new cases the Supreme Court received in its docket in 1955 was about 1,000. This number doubled by 1984, and tripled by
1992. Conversely, the number of criminal cases was about 5,500 in 1955, 4,000 in 1960,
3,000 in 1970, and 2,000 in 1984. Recently, it has been between 1,300 and 1,400, showing a
visibly downward trend.
10. By the statistical data for 1997, one-third of the pending cases continues to be in
the docket beyond one year. Ten percent of the cases took one to two years for disposition, 8.6% of the cases took more than two years to three years, and 5.7% took more than
three years. To summarize, cases which require deliberation take more than one year for a
judgment. Fifteen percent of those take more than two years.
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REVISION OF CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND ADOPTION
OF "CERTIORARI ,"

Revision of the civil procedure system is now a world-wide trend. During the past five years in Japan, the Civil Procedure Law has undergone a
substantial remodeling."
Discretionary certiorari jurisdiction is new to the Court. This system
was implemented as early as 1891 in the United States, and the present
system is based on revisions introduced in 1925. In the United States, the
cases of mandatory appeal have increased and measures against it are in
debate. This system has been introduced in Japan, and it would be premature to predict how this system would effectively work without seeing
2
the future results.'
D.

CONSTITUTIONALITY REVIEW AND HISTORY OF DENIAL
13
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

The Supreme Court of Japan has, for the past fifty years, given many
judgments on the cases involving constitutionality issues, along with its
history of adjudicating ordinary cases as the court of final appeal. Until
the end of 1998, about seven hundred criminal cases and 170 civil (including administrative) cases were reviewed by the Supreme Court. 14
Nevertheless, in only two criminal and four civil cases did the Supreme
Among these judgments, about 2. 5% of the judgments reverse the lower court judgments, and half of them were remanded to the lower courts for further adjudications. The
other half were adjudicated by the Supreme Court itself. The reversal and remand judgment is made in the event that in the Supreme Court's judgment, the lower court made
mistakes in interpreting the relevant laws and regulations. Hence, further fact-finding efforts are required in light of the correct interpretation of the laws and regulations, and this
accounts for about 1.2% of the total cases.
11. The main purpose for the revision has been to introduce more economical and
efficient methods for handling the cases to cope with the drastic increase in the number of
cases for trial. In particular, at the level of the fact-finding procedure, the efforts were
concentrated to establishing ways for accelerating the process of sorting out trial materials,
resolving issues at dispute, and discovering the method of disposition (including the disposition by settlement). For that purpose, the combination between the trial presentation and
the informal search for the settlement opportunity which had been practiced in the courtroom was vindicated by the revised law, and a method for more concentration of examination of witnesses was implemented to eliminate delay in the examination process.
12. This reformation is made applicable to the cases whose hearings were closed on or
after January 1, 1998, and, therefore, it is not applicable to all cases in the Court's docket.
Nevertheless, the number of pending cases decreased drastically. It is unlikely that the
number of those cases involving complicated and difficult issues having taken more than
two years for deliberation would decrease drastically with this reformation. The crucial
point to consider is how the total energy used for disposition of the final appeal cases could
possibly be mobilized to the difficult cases. It is unlikely that any abrupt improvement
could really be expected.
13. See Justice Itsuo Sonobe, Iken-shinsa no Hohri-Nippon no Keiken (Theories on
Constitutionality Review-experience of Japanese Court) Hoso-iiho attdst Times 47-11-1.
14. The Supreme Court compiled especially the cases involving constitutional issues
that were reviewed by the Supreme Court from 1947 to 1989 and published them in 1989 as
"Saikosaibansho Kempo Hanreisyu (Report of Cases involving Constitutional Issues of the
Supreme Court), 5 vols. with index." This Report contains 690 criminal cases and 146 civil
cases. From 1990 to 1998, more than 17 criminal cases and 20 civil cases were reviewed by
the Supreme Court.
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Court find unconstitutionality. 15 Very few cases have met the declaration
of unconstitutionality and that has been criticized by outsiders, in particular, legal scholars, as indicative of an ultra-conservatism or an excessive
concessiveness. However, this criticism is not warranted. As Justice Sonobe points out, 16 in general, the Japanese courts adopt a very careful,
cautious approach in reviewing the constitutionality of any act of the
State. The Supreme Court of Japan maintains this approach to the constitutional issues with due deference to (a) the political judgment, or the socalled Act of State, exercised by the Diet and the Cabinet, and (b) the
legislative discretion used by the Diet as the supreme legislative body.
This attitude comes from the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Judges who are not elected by the
national election process are not in a position to take responsibility directly vis-a-vis the national constituents with respect to highly political
decisions.
15. (1) Parricide.
The old criminal code, which penalized parricide more severely than other homicides,
was declared as "an obviously unreasonable discriminatory treatment" and hence unconstitutional. Parricide Case, 27 Criminal Cases Report 3, 265 (Sup. Ct., April 4, 1973).
(2) Confiscation of third party's property.
Confiscation of a vessel used for criminal offense, belonging to a third party without
involving the owner third party to the procedure was declared unconstitutional Third Party
Confiscation Case, 16 Criminal Cases Report 11, 1593 (Sup. Ct., Nov. 28, 1962).
(3) Proximity control of pharmaceutical retailers.
A rule for controlling distances among the pharmaceutical retailers was declared as contravening the guarantee of the freedom of professions on the grounds that "it exceeded the
reasonable administrative discretion." Sumiyashi, Inc. v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefacture, 29 Civil Cases Report 4, 572 (Sup. Ct., April 30, 1975).
(4) Forest Law case.
While the purpose of the law stated as "by means of preventing the forest land from
being unduly fragmented, attempt to stabilize the management of the forests, and in consequence thereof, protect and cherish the forests and strengthen the productive power of the
forests, and thus contribute to the development of the national economy" meets the public
welfare, but the provisions of the law where a co-owner of the forest land having a share of
no more than one half is forbidden from requesting the other co-owners to partition his
share was declared unconstitutional by being unreasonable and unnecessary restriction and
violative of Article 29 of the Constitution which protects the property right. Hiraguchi v.
Hiraguchi, 41 Civil Cases Report 3, 408 (Sup. Ct., April 22, 1987).
(5) Suit seeking judgment of unconstitutionality of rules for allocation of Diet seats
among districts. The allocation of Diet seats among districts which was once reasonable
has become inequitable in light of population shifts was declared as exceeding the permissible scope of the Dietary discretion and hence unconstitutional. Kanao et al. v. Hiroshima
Prefecture Election Commission, 39 Civil Cases Report 5, 1100 (Sup. Ct., July 17, 1985).
But, it refrained from declaring nullity of the election perse. This type of judgment which is
called the "judgment of the situations," may be regarded as a judge-made law having established a sort of system of the declaratory judgment. Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture
Election Commission, 30 Civil Cases Report 3, 223 (Sup. Ct., April 14, 1976).
(6) Suit seeking judgment of unconstitutionality of public donation to Shinto shrine.
Governor of Ehime Prefecture donated from the public fund to celebrate the festival of
Yasukuni Shrine, a religious organization enshrining spirits of the war victims in Shinto
manners. It was held that the donation contravened the provisions of the Constitution
declaring the selection of the state, first from the religious, namely Article 20, Paragraph 3
and Article 89 of the Constitution. Anzai, et al. v. Governor of Ehime Prefecture, 51 Civil
Cases Report 4, 1673 (Sup. Ct., April 2, 1997).
16. See Justice Itsuo Sonobe; op. cit., 28.
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MATTERS TO WHICH POWER TO REVIEW CONSTITUTIONALITY

CAN NOT REACH

1. Abstract Checking of Legislative Actions
Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution is the explicit declaration of the
ability of the courts to review the constitutionality of legislation, based on
the judicial traditions such as Marbury v. Madison (1803) in the United
States. In its monumental judgment rendered on July 7, 1948, the
Supreme Court of Japan declared that "it has no power to determine the
constitutionality of the law and ordinances in abstract terms with no reference to the concrete and actual cases involving the issue."'1 7 Soon afterward, it further declared that it was not the so-called Constitution Court
empowered to exercise the abstract checking of legislative actions. 18
The German Constitution Court is empowered to review the constitutionality of any particular law, without reference to any particular case.
In Japan, however, the prevailing interpretation is as mentioned before,
with due deference to the legislative power of the Diet, and the same
principle prevails in the United States as well.
2.

Act of State and Matters Belonging to Private Determinations

Traditionally, any highly political act of the state is outside of judicial
review, and this tradition persists in the United Kingdom, as the so-called
"act of state" doctrine. The equivalent notion is also supported in France
as the "acte de gouvernement" and in Germany as the "Regierungsakt."
The same tradition prevails in Japan, and the Supreme Court declared a
similar doctrine with respect to the constitutionality of the U.S./Japan Security Treaty and the Law of Special Measures regarding Land for U.S.
Military Force in Okinawa ("Sunakawa Case" in 195919 and the suit for
executive order permitting in-lieu execution of signature and other actions of Prefectural Governor of Okinawa in 1997 ).20
The other area where the Court refrained from exercising its power to
review constitutionality involved the relationship between the State or
any other public bodies and the private individuals, if it remains to be a
problem inside a society or organization standing on the autonomous
17. See 2 Criminal Cases Report 8, 801 (Sup. Ct., July 7, 1948).
18. See Matters of Reserved Army of Police, 6 Civil Cases Report 9, 782 (Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 8, 1952).
19. Sunakawa Case, 13 Criminal Cases Report 13, 3225 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1959). It is
sometimes pointed out that, although these judgments refer to the "highly political nature"
of the subject matters, it reserves a qualifying statement that "as long as [ the subject
matter] is not obviously and apparently unconstitutional and invalid," and that this shows
the fact that the Court does not solely rely on the "act of state" doctrine.
20. Okinawa case, 50 Civil Cases Report 7, 1952 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 29, 1997). Likewise,
the Supreme Court has placed outside of its judicial review such problems as constitutionality of the act of the Cabinet to dissolve the House of Representative (Tomabechi Case in
1960, 14 Civil Cases Report 7, 1206 (Sup. Ct., June 8, 1960); and the issue of adequacy of
the procedures adopted for enactment of the law in the two Houses of the Diet (Case of
Invalidity of Revision of Law of Police Professions in 1962, 16 Civil Cases Report 3, 445
(Sup. Ct., March 7, 1962).
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principle.2 1
3. Dispute Inside a Private Organizationor Between Private
Individuals
Should a court give any judgment of constitutionality in a case where a
fundamental human right constitutionally guaranteed is allegedly impaired within the- relationship between individuals? In one case, it was
alleged that a corporation discriminated against job applicants by considering their thoughts and beliefs. The Supreme Court denied the direct
application of the constitutional provisions on the grounds that (i) the
relevant provisions of the Constitution, or Articles 14 and 19, are not
designed directly to regulate the rights and obligations between the individuals; (ii) the legislative measures are always available for protection of
the rights of freedom and equality of individuals within a privately controlled relationship; and (iii) that the rescue from the infringement of
those rights may be accomplished by application of such provisions of the
Civil Code as Article 1 which prohibits the abusive exercise of civil rights,
Article 90 which nullifies private acts contravening the public morals, and
Article 709, which declares the basic principle of tort liabilities.
V.

CURRENT PROBLEM FOR JUDICIARY

The burden of the judiciary has increased remarkably upon the collapse of what is now dubbed the "bubble economy," meaning the economy based on the extraordinary boost of money flow and the unusual rise
of the prices of land and securities. This burden is raised not only for
coping with the increasing cases, but for meeting the national demand
and expectation for more effective judicial functions, and meeting the
outcry for the improvement of the entire judicial system including the
increase in the number of legal professionals engaged in the litigation.
The Government has recently established the "Judicial Reform Counsel,"
with the aim of completing the study of the pending problems within the
next two years. The Civil Procedure Law has been revised, and several
special measures to improve the civil execution procedures have been implemented, but the efforts for solving the whole pile of the problems have
just begun.

21. See Yamakitamura Case, 14 Civil Cases Report 12, 2633 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 19, 1960)
involving the position of a local Diet member in 1960, Toyama University Case, 31 Civil
Cases Report 2, 234 (Sup. Ct., March 15, 1977) involving the endowment of scholarly degree in a national university and Shutokuji, 34 Civil Cases Report 11, 1 (Sup. Ct., Jan. 11,
1980) involving an inside dispute in a religious organization in 1980.

